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Abstract
As the rapid growth of wireless communication, physical layer security becomes impor-
tant recently. Unlike wired transmissions, the nature of wireless transmissions makes the
transmitted signals over the channel easily to be eavesdropped and jammed by malicious
adversaries. The eavesdropper posts a significant threat to the privacy of public people,
and the jamming attack blocks the wireless transmission. Therefore, privacy and reliability
of the wireless communication system are easily compromised compared to the wired com-
munication system. Consequently, wireless network security has attracted public attention
in the recent years. Wireless networks can be secured in all layers of a network protocol
stack which include application, transport, network, data link and physical layers. This
thesis focuses on the physical layer security in wireless communication. Specifically, the
physical layer security we are focusing on has two significant branches which are orthogonal
frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) related security system and frequency hopping
(FH) system. The former one is to prevent transmitting information from stealing, and
the latter one focuses on preventing jamming attacks. It is commonly known that OFDM
is widely used in wireless communication systems, including WIFI and cellular system. In
the first part of this thesis, we use software defined radio to implement an existing OFDM
encryption scheme called OFDM Enc in IEEE 802.11a standard, and the implementations
are done in microwave anechoic chamber and laboratory environment separately. Based
on the implementation performed in the GNU radio, we find a multipath boundary in
the OFDM Enc. In the second part of this thesis, we propose a new FH system named
randomly selective m-sequence based BLADES system. Specifically, the collision properties
of two distinct binary primitive polynomials of the same degree for the new FH system
have been analysed and simulated.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the rapid growth of modern communication, the bandwidth used for transmission
become precious and physical layer security becomes important than ever. Especially for
wireless transmission, large amounts of data transmission happen in shared channel at the
same time. Therefore, a communication scheme should provide high bandwidth efficiency
and a security scheme built in the communication scheme should have high security and
less negative effect on the performance of the overall communication system.
One of such communication modulations with high bandwidth efficiency is called or-
thogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM). It not only has good resistance on in-
tersymbol interference but also saves large bandwidth due to its orthogonality. As a special
case of frequency division multiplexing, OFDM has high spectral efficiency compared to
M-ary frequency-shift keying (MFSK) which needs large guard bandwidth among subcar-
riers to reduce the intercarrier interference. Furthermore, OFDM has good resistance on
multipath delay in fading channel. In addition, it can be easily implemented by inverse
fast fourier transform (IFFT) and fast fourier transform (FFT).
One interesting physical layer security scheme called OFDM Enc encryption scheme
from the paper entitled as “A new efficient physical layer OFDM encryption scheme”
by [17]. It demonstrates an effective way to secure OFDM samples in physical layer, which
is fast and has a high efficiency of encryption. The simulation result of OFDM Enc given
in [17] is simple and does not include implementations in a practical OFDM communication
system so it is necessary to deeply analyse the influence of OFDM Enc on the performance
of a practical OFDM system.
Jamming attack posts a threat to wireless communication, because it sends interference
signals (generally artificial noises) to confuse receivers. The second part of this thesis pro-
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poses a new physical layer frequency hopping (FH) scheme for anti-jamming. We analyse
and simulate the collision properties of two m-sequences which are generated from two
distinct binary primitive polynomials of the same degree respectively.
The main contributions of our work can be summarized as below:
(i) Implemented the OFDM encryption scheme given by [17] in software defined radio
(SDR) and tested in microwave anechoic chamber and lab environment separately.
In fact, the spectrums at both sender side and receiver side are captured, and the bit
error rate has been counted for the OFDM encryption scheme. Note that the original
paper [17] only gives simulation results of the OFDM encryption scheme in additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel in Simulink.
(ii) Found a multipath boundary in the OFDM encryption scheme. The performance of
the OFDM encryption scheme in multipath AWGN channel is tested in GNU radio,
and the results indicate a significant bit error rate (BER) increase comparing with
that of the OFDM system without encryption. Note that the multipath effect on the
OFDM encryption scheme is not considered in [17].
(iii) Proposed a new anti-jamming system called randomly selective m-sequence based
BLADES system. The collision probability between two distinct binary primitive
polynomials of the same degree is discussed in detail. The exhaustive emulation of
the collision probability has also been given.
The organization of the thesis is given as follows. The literature survey is demonstrated
in Chapter 2 for both OFDM Enc given by [17] and m-sequences related frequency hop-
ping system. Chapter 3 is the background of OFDM related standard and m-sequences.
Chapter 4 focuses on how to implement OFDM Enc using SDR and the experiments setup
procedures. Chapter 5 is about the testing results and analysis of OFDM Enc. Chapter 6
proposes the new m-sequences based Buffalo Laboratories Application of Digitally Exact
Spectra (BLADES) system and its simulation results. Finally, the conclusions and the
future work are given in Chapter 7.
2
Chapter 2
Literature Survey
This chapter demonstrates the literature survey on OFDM related encryption schemes
and anti-jamming systems. Section 2.1 demonstrates OFDM related encryption schemes.
Additionally, it discussed some unsolved problems in one of the OFDM encryption schemes
called OFDM Enc. Section 2.2 introduces several anti-jamming systems, security concerns
and design limitations of an anti-jamming system.
2.1 Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM)
Based Security
This section describes the literature survey on several OFDM encryption schemes and some
unsolved problems in the OFDM Enc encryption scheme.
2.1.1 OFDM Encryption Schemes
OFDM scheme becomes popular and it is widely used in the wireless system because of its
high bandwidth efficiency and good intersymbol interference (ISI) resistance. One famous
OFDM related security schemes is ijam given in [9]. In the presence of eavesdropper (EV),
it allows two wireless devices to exchange secret keys without encryption. The ijam actively
sends jamming signal in order to jam the transmitting signals, and the ijam shares the
jamming info only to the legitimate receiver, so that only the legitimate receiver knows
how to recover the jammed signal but EV cannot recover it.
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Another OFDM related security given in [14] demonstrated a two-way authentication
method between two OFDM devices. In fact, it uses the inherent physical features of
the multi-path fading channel as signature for the message transmission. The OFDM re-
lated security given in [40] illustrates a encryption method by inserting dummy data to
randomly reserved subcarriers to mix up OFDM subcarriers, which randomizes waveform.
The dummy data and subcarriers’ location are secrete info for transceiver which are gen-
erated by pre shared information. Furthermore, the OFDM security method given in [1]
shows that the OFDM encryption can be done by hiding certain synchronization infor-
mation based on a pre-shared secret key sequence. In paper [1], it mentioned that their
security scheme is resistant to multipath fading and impulsive noise.
In the paper [17], the authors proposed a new OFDM security scheme called OFDM
Enc. The operation of this scheme is mainly in physical layer, and key exchange is done in
upper layer. The OFDM Enc actually encrypts the discrete time domain samples between
the IFFT and digital-to-analog convertor (DAC), then it decrypts the discrete time samples
between the FFT and analog-to-digital convertor (ADC).
In the following, we will provide a detailed specification of this scheme, since that is
the scheme that we will implement. The encryption of OFDM Enc has two pseudorandom
generator (PRG)s which outputs either −1 or 1. In detail, the first PRG is used to encrypt
the real part of sample data by multiplication, and the second PRG is to encrypt the
imaginary part of the data by multiplication; specifically, the first key stream is denoted
as
u = (u0, u1, u2, . . .)
and the second key stream is denoted as
v = (v0, v1, v2, . . .).
Assume the sample data in discrete time domain before the OFDM Enc is
x = (x0, x1, x2, . . .).
Then sample data after the OFDM Enc is
x′ = Enc(x) = (x′0, x
′
1, x
′
2, . . .)
= (<{x0}u0 + j={x0}v0,<{x1}u1 + j={x1}v1,<{x2}u2 + j={x2}v2, . . .). (2.1)
At the receiver side, the decryption use the same structure as the encryption part.
Assume that the sample data before the OFDM Enc decryption at the receiver side is
y′ = (y′0, y
′
1, y
′
2, . . .)
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and the decrypted data is
y = Dec(y′) = (y0, y1, y2, . . .)
= (<{y′0}u0 + j={y′0}v0,<{y′1}u1 + j={y′1}v1,<{y′2}u2 + j={y′2}v2, . . .). (2.2)
2.1.2 Some Unsolved Problems in OFDM Enc Encryption Scheme
There are several problems arising from the implementation of the scheme OFDM Enc
using SDR. The first problem is whether the OFDM Enc encryption scheme should be
placed before or after the cyclic prefix (CP), which is not mentioned in [17]. It is necessary
to figure out the best place to insert the OFDM Enc as the reference of CP.
Secondly, the symbol error rate versus SNR ratio plot of OFDM Enc in [17] was obtained
from a simulated AWGN channel. The paper does not consider other commonly existed
channel effect, such as multipath delay effect. However, the multipath effect exists in
practice. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the performance of the entire OFDM system
with OFDM Enc in the multipath channel.
The third is that multipath fading effect on OFDM Enc is not considered in [17]. One
assumption is that the performance of OFDM system with OFDM Enc may be reduced by
the multipath channel compared to the OFDM system without using OFDM Enc. In fact,
the OFDM modulation and demodulation have good resistance on multipath delay when
enough CP is provided [31]. However, it will leave “noise” in the data if the OFDM Enc
decryption cannot completely recover the cyphertext data samples at the receiver side due
to the multipath effect.
Based on the assumption, one concern is that the OFDM demodulator may not be able
to remove the left noise effectively. Furthermore, if the OFDM demodulator can remove
the residual noise, it needs to sacrifice the performance in terms of bit error rate. The
detail analysis of the impact of multipath delay on 802.11 OFDM scheme with OFDM Enc
will be given, which is important for its future improvements.
2.2 Anti-jamming systems
This section gives the literature survey on anti-jamming systems and security concerns. In
addition, the limitation on designing physical layer security is given.
5
2.2.1 Threat from Reactive Jamming Attack
The well-known effective smart jamming attack is reactive jamming attack [5, 6], which
can jam the signal while there is a transmission and stay quiet while there is no signal
sending by the sender. This strategy gives the reactive jammer good energy use efficiency
and makes it hard to be detected and removed from the system.
2.2.2 Anti-jamming Systems and Performance Concerns
Anti-jamming systems are invented [21, 25, 29, 30, 33] in order to overcome the jamming
attack. FH system has been invented to solve those jamming attacks [2, 5, 22]. BLADES
system was proposed in the middle of 1950s and successfully implemented in 1963 as the
first working FH system in the world [5, 32, 34]. BLADES system uses two sequences to
generate hopping frequencies instead of using just one sequence [5].
Jamming attack posts a threat on a communication system by sending interference
signals to change current transmitting bits, insert bits, damage underlying modulation
and so on [6]. Actually, there are several commonly known jamming attacks, like full-band
jamming attack, partial band jamming, pulse jamming attack, single tone jamming attack,
multitone jamming attack and the repeat back jamming attack [5]. Full-band jammer
can jam entire band but it has low power efficiency and is easy to be found. Partial
band jammer, pulse jamming jammer, single tone jammer and multitone jammer use lower
power but still can be detected. The most effective jamming attack is the reactive jamming
attack. It will stay quiet when there is no transmission and start to jam when it senses
the transmission in the channel [6]. This property makes it hard to be detected.
For the BLADES system, if the two PRGs output the same hopping frequency at certain
time i, which means a collision happened, then the receiver could not despread the hopping
frequency at that time, so it will increase the BER of the system. If two distinct primitive
polynomials of the same degree are used as the two PRGs in BLADES system, then there
is no previous work about how to select the two distinct primitive polynomials of the same
degree to reduce the number of collisions.
If ∃t ≥ 0, fat = fbt , then the receiver could not despread the hopping frequency at
time i. Therefore collisions between two PRGs increase the BER. In order to reduce the
probability of occurrence of the collision, we need to analyse the collision properties of two
distinct binary primitive polynomials of the same degree. This could help us to figure out
how to select the best pairs to reduce the collision probabilityn. In brief, the motivation
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of analyzing the collision properties in the BLADES system is to reduce the BER caused
by the collisions.
2.2.3 Current Limitation on Designing Physical Layer Security
Light-weight PRG have less effect on transmission rate. M -sequence generators are one
of this kind. As the growth of the high speed wireless communication, the 5th generation
mobile networks (5G) will be used in commercial for future years. The transmission data
rate of 5G is about 10-50 Gbps that is much higher than the data rate of 4th generation
Long Term Evolution (4G-LTE) which has 3 Gbps in downlink [13]. Based on the fact, the
speed of the PRG which generates hopping frequencies should have higher or equal data
rate, otherwise FH system will become the bottleneck in a communication system which
cannot be tolerated. Actually, an m-sequence is built by using small number of XOR gates
and shift registers. Therefore, the speed of generating m-sequence depends on the speed
of a XOR gate or a shift register. The optical shift register can reach 100Gbps [24] and
the optical XOR gate can reach up to 40 Gbps [38]. Since m-sequence generation speed is
limited by the XOR gate, it matches the data rate of 5G which is 10-50 Gbps in theory.
Based on this property, m-sequence could be a solution in FH systems.
7
Chapter 3
Background and Preliminaries
This chapter demonstrates background and preliminaries of this thesis. Section 3.1 intro-
duces basic theories of OFDM communication system. Section 3.2 introduces the OFDM
standards used in WIFI and the cellular system. Section 3.3 introduces the finite impulse
response (FIR) filter and multipath delay effect. Section 3.4 introduces the m-sequence
and its randomness properties.
3.1 OFDM Communication System
This section introduces the basic structure of the OFDM system. In detail, it gives basic
concepts of underlying modulation, inverse discrete Fourier transform (IDFT), discrete
Fourier transform (DFT), the orthogonality and CP for a general OFDM system.
3.1.1 Introduction to OFDM System
In [4], the authors proposed a communication scheme called OFDM to transmit multiple
messages simultaneously on a linear bandlimited channel without involving intersymbol
interference and inter-channel interference. The total bandwidth W has been divided into
multiple sub-channels, and those sub-channels are overlapping with each other one by one.
However, they will not affect each other during the transmission in a linear bandlimited
channel due to the orthogonality of the subcarriers. According to [17], [20] and [15], the
basic model of OFDM system contains serial-to-parallel conversion, underlying modulation,
N-IFFT and DAC conversion at the sender side. At the receiver side, it contains ADC
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conversion, N-FFT, parallel-to-serial conversion and underlying demodulation. From [37]
and [35], pilot symbols and pilot carriers are used for channel estimation. The number of
subcarriers N is equal to the size of the IFFT and FFT, and each subcarrier is orthogonal
to each other. We will restate the details on the usage of those subcarriers in the next
section, and the properties of OFDM will be deferred to Chapter 4.
3.1.2 Underlying Modulation
The underlying modulation is also called sub-carrier modulation. The process of underlying
modulation is done before the serial-to-parallel conversion. The purpose of the underlying
modulation is to map the input bits into constellation in complex domain. The underly-
ing modulations include binary phase-shift keying (BPSK), quadrature phase-shift keying
(QPSK), quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) and so on. The selection of those
modulations depends on the channel condition and the communication regulation. Under
a limited transmission power, the system under better channel conditions, such as opti-
cal channel which has little noise, can use higher modulation methods, such as 32-QAM
or 64-QAM, to increase the information rate. In contrast, it is better to choose lower
modulation methods such as BPSK or QPSK to keep the low error probability in a high
noise channel, such as wireless channels. For instance, the bit error probability of M-ary
phase-shift keying (MPSK) is given in Equation (3.1) [8].
Pb ≈ 2
log2M
Q(
√
2Eb
N0
log2Msin(
pi
M
)). (3.1)
Under the same SNR, Eb
N0
, increasing the value M will increase the bit error probability.
3.1.3 Inverse Discrete Fourier Transform (IDFT) and Discrete
Fourier Transform (DFT)
IFFT is a significant part in the OFDM system. The IDFT is shown in Equation (3.2).
si =
1√
N
N−1∑
k=0
Ske
j2piik
N , i, k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1. (3.2)
The IDFT is used at the OFDM sender to convert frequency domain samples to time
domain samples. The IFFT has a lower complexity to get the time domain samples for
the realization purpose in hardware.
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The DFT is shown in Equation (3.2).
Si =
1√
N
N−1∑
k=0
ske
− j2piik
N , i, k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1. (3.3)
The IDFT is used at the OFDM receiver to calculate the frequency domain samples from
the time domain samples. The FFT is the low complexity method to calculate the DFT
in hardware.
3.1.4 Orthogonality
Orthogonality is a word to demonstrate that the frequency domain signals do not affect
each other and the product integral between their time domain signals is zero. In fact,
the samples before the IFFT in OFDM system are viewed as discrete frequency samples,
and the IFFT will convert them to discrete time samples. Therefore, the subcarriers of
those time samples after the DAC and low-pass filter are orthogonal to each other. The
basic idea of OFDM system is equivalent to window the sampling train in time domain,
and this is also equivalent to convolute frequency domain train by a sinc function, which
is to make sure that the sidelobes of each subcarrier will be zeros at the other subcarriers’
center point. The mathematic derivation is shown in Chapter 4.3. Finally, the low-pass
filter is a process to window the spectrum in frequency domain and this is the process to
shape the discrete signal pulses in continuous time domain. Because of the property of
the IDFT, the frequency domain spectrum during the transmission is orthogonal to each
other.
3.1.5 Cyclic Prefix
CP is used to reduce the ISI [8]. According to [26], if the duration of CP is longer than
channel delay spread, the ISI will be completely removed. The reason that uses CP instead
of using padding zeros is to avoid involving direct current (DC) offset which increases the
BER a lot [16]. The prefix interval generally will be N/4 which is 16 when N is equal to
64 in our case.
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3.2 Specification of OFDM in Wireless Communica-
tion Standard
This section introduces two OFDM related wireless communication standards which are
IEEE 802.11a standard and 4G-LTE standard.
3.2.1 Introduction to IEEE 802.11a OFDM Standard
According to [18], the channel usage for 64-IFFT OFDM system in the IEEE 802.11a is
shown in Figure 3.1. The standard assumes that the subcarriers have been labeled from
−32 to 31. In detail, only 48 subcarriers are used to transmit data and 4 subcarriers
(−21,−7, 7, 21) are used for pilot carriers for channel estimation as shown in Figure 3.1.
Unused subcarriers from -31 to -25 and from 27 to 31 is to prevent the leakage of 52
subcarriers’ sidelobes power to the outside of the total bandwidth. Finally, the DC is
labeled as 0 subcarrier and IEEE 802.11a OFDM does not use the DC subcarrier to transmit
the information; therefore, the DC subcarrier is inserted a complex number 0 at the carrier
allocator before the IFFT.
In summary, the IEEE 802.11a OFDM has the following specifications.
• Total bandwidth is 20 MHz, and total subcarrier is 52 from −26 to 26 (not include
DC at 0), and subcarriers from -32 to -27 and from 27 to 31 are not used. DC
subcarrier 0 is not used.
• Underlying modulation could be BPSK, QPSK, 16-QAM, and 64-QAM.
• There are 48 data subcarrier and 4 pilot subcarriers used for the channel estimation.
The pilot subcarriers are located at −21,−7, 7, 21, and pilot symbols are modulated
by BPSK.
• The information rate could be 6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 36, 48, 54 Mbits/s.
3.2.2 Long-Term Evolution (LTE) OFDM Standard
According to [19], the total Bandwidth of Long-Term Evolution (LTE) frequency division
duplex (FDD) could be 1.4 MHz, 3 MHz, 5MHz, 10 MHz, 15 MHz, and 20 MHz. In detail,
LTE physical layer for 1.4MHz bandwidth is specified as following.
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Figure 3.1: 802.11a OFDM Spectrum 64 Subcarriers Usage
• Each LTE FDD frame has 10 microseconds and 10 subframes.
• Each subframe occupied two time slots. Each time slot contains 7 symbols, and is
divided into 6 resources block in frequency domain.
• Each resource block has 180kHz bandwidth and contains 12 subcarriers (not include
DC subcarrier).
• By calculation, each subcarrier has 15 kHz bandwidth.
• There are total 73 subcarriers (DC subcarrier included) for its downlink, and 72
subcarriers (no DC subcarrier) for its uplink.
The resource block is the smallest unit to be assigned to each user [19]. LTE uses single
carrier-frequency division multiple access (SC-FDMA) which has lower peak-to-average
power ratio and reduces the cost of amplifier and less power usage. In SC-FDMA [19], the
users’ data modulates for uplink is shown in the following procedure.
Step 1: Each user data is modulated by underlying modulation (QPSK, 16-QAM, or 64-
QAM), and those data are viewed as time domain data.
Step 2: The modulated data is converted to frequency domain by using FFT.
Step 3: The frequency domain points are mapped onto the subcarrier which assigned to
the users.
Step 4: The entire Frequency domain points are converted into time domain by using
IFFT.
The FFT size is the number of total subcarriers assigned to a user, which has minimum
one resource block length (12 subcarriers). The size of the IFFT is the total number of the
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subcarriers. Generally, each user’s data does not occupy entire spectrum, so that the size
of FFT is smaller than the IFFT size at the sender side.
Comparing with IEEE 802.11 standard, the biggest difference is that SC-FDMA has
FFT between the underlying modulation and carrier allocator at the sender side; therefore,
the user data in IEEE 802.11 is viewed as frequency domain points, and the user data in
SC-FDMA is viewed as time domain points.
3.3 Finite Impulse Response (FIR) Filter and Multi-
path Channel
This section introduces the FIR filter and the multipath channel model.
3.3.1 FIR Filter
The structure of general FIR filter is shown in Figure 3.2. Each Z−1 in Z transform means
delay 1 sample. In addition, αk is the multiplication factor for each delay. For example, if
h is equal to 2, then y[2] = α0x[2] + α1x[1]. The past signal with delay effect will interfere
the current transmitting signal. Furthermore, if h− 1 is lager than the length of CP, then
it will cause ISI.
Figure 3.2: FIR Filter
The FIR filter is commonly used to simulate the multipath delay effect in digital com-
munication system. The higher the integer value h, the longer the delay effect for each
sample will be on future received samples.
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3.3.2 Multipath Delay Effect on OFDM Enc
Recall the notation in Section 2.1.1, xk is the sending samples in OFDM system without
OFDM Enc at the sender side, and x′k is the sending samples after the OFDM Enc at the
sender side. At the receiver side, y′k is the received discrete samples before OFDM Enc
decryption and y˜k is the samples after the decryption. Additionally, {uk} and {vk} are two
key streams from PRG respectively, and {uk}, {vk} ∈ {−1, 1}.
xk = <{xk}+ j={xk}
= ak + jbk, where ak = <{xk} and bk = ={xk} (3.4)
x′k = Enc(xk) = akuk + jbkvk
= a′k + jb
′
k, where a
′
k = akuk and b
′
k = bkvk.
(3.5)
In general, the line-of-sight (LOS) is the path which directly connects the transmitter
and the receiver, where is no boundary between them. The signal passing through it has
the lowest fading effect, so it has the strongest power compared with the signals passing the
through the other longer paths. In other words, a signal with longer transmission distance
generally has longer transmission delay and lower power at the receiver side due to fading
effect. The other paths which are not LOS generally causes multipath delay by reflection
and scattering from buildings and other obstacles [3].
y′k =
h−1∑
i=0
αix
′
k−i + βk, k ≥ k − i ≥ 0, h ≥ 1 (3.6)
where αi is the fading coefficient on i’th path and βi is the Gaussian noise variable. Equa-
tion (3.6) indicates a multipath AWGN channel in discrete time domain. In detail, the
parameter h in the equation is the number of the total paths in the transmission, and
the βi in the equation is AWGN noise introduced during the transmission and αi is FIR
filter’s coefficient which indicates the impact of the (k − i)th sample on the kth sample.
The first received sample y0 at the beginning of the transmission will not be affected by
any multipath delay because there is no previous transmission but only the current signal
x0. However, the multipath delay takes effect from the second received sample y1 if the
multipath number h is higher than or equal to two. Furthermore, from Equation (3.6), y′1
has term α0x
′
1, so the higher the coefficient α0 is, the greater the effect of the first sam-
ple will be on the second received sample. For simplicity, we assume that all attenuation
coefficients αk and AWGN βk are real.
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In general, the multipath channel does not enlarge the signal strength, so that the result
of α0 +α1 + . . .+αh−1 should be lower than or equal to 1 after normalization. In our case,
the sum is always normalized to be 1.
For OFDM system, multipath AWGN channel can be formulated into Equation (3.7)
(see Chapter 12.4 in [8]).
y′k = x
′
k ∗ αk + β′k, where “*” denotes the convolution of {xk} and {αk}. (3.7)
We rewrite Equation (3.6) in order to show the influence of multipath AWGN channel on
each N samples where N is the size of the inverse fast fourier transform. Note that y0 in
Equation (3.7) is the first sample in each IFFT output N samples and it is not the first
sample at the beginning of the transmission as before.
The matrix form of Equation (3.7) is

y′N−1
y′N−2
...
y′0
 =

α0 α1 . . . αh−1 0 . . . 0
0 α0 . . . αh−2 αh−1 . . . 0
...
...
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
0 . . . 0 α0
. . . αh−2 αh−1
...
...
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
α2 α3 . . . αh−3 . . . α0 α1
α1 α2 . . . αh−2 . . . 0 α0


x′N−1
x′N−2
...
x′0
+

βN−1
βN−2
...
β0
 (3.8)
In Equation (3.8), the first several samples consist of CP terms inserted to reduce the ISI.
For example,
y′0 = α1x
′
N−1 + α2x
′
N−2 + . . .+ αh−1x
′
N−h+1 + 0 + . . .+ 0 + α0x
′
0.
The CP terms on y′0 are α1x
′
N−1+α2x
′
N−2+ . . .+αh−1x
′
N−h+1. In opposite, if there is no CP
inserted, then from the xN−1 to xN−h+1 in those terms will be replaced by previous block’s
terms which are from x−1 to x−h+1. It means that y′0 is affected by ISI from previous block
and has to be discarded at the receiver side [8].
3.4 Randomness Properties of M-sequences
This section introduces randomness properties of m-sequences and basic concepts of re-
ciprocal pairs of m-sequences. The last subsection introduces the structure of BLADES
system.
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3.4.1 M-sequences
First of all, the left shift operator Li on an infinite sequence a = (a0, a1, a2, . . .) is defined
as follows
Lia = (ai, ai+1, ai+2, . . .), i = 1, 2, . . . . (3.9)
For convenience, we define L0a = a as the identity map. A infinite sequence a is called
a periodic sequence with period T if it satisfies expression a = LTa and Lia 6= a for any
0 < i < T .
For two infinite sequences a = (a0, a1, a2, . . .) and b = (b0, b1, b2, . . .), if there exists a
non-negative numbers i which satisfies Lia = b, then a and b are called shift-equivalent
and denoted as a ∼ b. Otherwise, they are not shift-equivalent denoted as a  b.
We uses the following notation to represent a l-tuple started at ak, i.e.,
a[k, l] = (ak, ak+1, . . . , ak+l−1), 0 ≤ k < k + l.
For any starting point k, the set consisting all l-tuples of a is denoted by
a[l] = {a[k, l] : k ≥ 0}, ∀l > 0.
Let S be a set consisting of N sequences with period T . We use S[l] to represent the
set consisting all l-tuples of all sequences in S, i.e.,
S[l] =
⋃
a∈S
a[l],∀l > 0.
If all sequences in S are shift-equivalent, then S is called a shift-equivalent class. We
have the following property
Property 1. If S is a shift equivalent class, then
S[l] = a[l],∀l > 0, a ∈ S.
The linear feedback function of an n-stage linear feedback shift register (LFSR) is
associated with a polynomial [5] as
f(x0, x1, . . . , xn−1) = c0x0+ c1x1 + . . .+ cn−1xn−1
l
f(x) = c0+ c1x+ . . .+ cn−1xn−1 + xn.
The polynomial f(x) is called a characteristic polynomial of the LFSR, and a characteristic
polynomial of a LFSR determines its output sequence’s period [5]. In general, the period
of sequence generated by an n-stage LFSR is defined in Definition 1.
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Definition 1. Let a be a sequence generated by an n-stage LFSR over F, then the period
of a is less than or equal to qn − 1 [11, Chapter 4].
M -sequence is a special case of Definition 1, and it is defined in Definition 2.
Definition 2. A 2-ary sequence generated by an n-stage LFSR is called a maximal length
binary sequence if it has period 2n − 1. which is also called binary m-sequence [11].
In this thesis, all m-sequences are binary m-sequences. A binary polynomial of degree n
with period 2n−1 is also called primitive polynomial over F2, and the LFSR corresponded to
a primitive polynomial generates m-sequences [5]. In brief, the binary primitive polynomial
of degree n can be used to generate m-sequence with period 2n − 1. In detail, if a binary
primitive polynomial f(x) for a LFSR is used to define a finite field GF (2n), the root of the
f(x) is denoted as α satisfied f(α) = 0. Then the m-sequence generated by the primitive
polynomial f(x) is defined as
ai = Tr(α
i), i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1
where the trace function Tr(x) is defined as
Tr(x) = x+ x2 + . . .+ x2n−1, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1.
In [11], it demonstrates that if an m-sequence a is generated by a primitive polynomial
f(x) with a nonzero initial value, it defines G(f) as
G(f) = {Lia : 0 ≤ i ≤ 2n − 2} ∪ {0}
and we also define G(f)∗ = G(f) \ {0}.
In order to classify the m-sequence pairs, Pn(x) is used to denote the set of all the
binary primitive polynomials with degree n, and use N = 2n − 1 to denote the period of
the m-sequence.
Additionally, Property 2 shows the properties of the m-sequence which will be uesd in
this thesis.
Property 2. M-sequences have following properties given in [5]
(i) All m-sequences generated by the same LFSR are shift equivalent. If two m-sequences
are generated by two different LFSRs, then they are shift distinct.
(ii) Any 2i-decimation of a is a shift of a for i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1
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(iii) If s satisfies gcd(s, 2n − 1) = 1 and s 6= 2i with i = 0, 1, 2, . . ., s-decimation of a is
still an m-sequence of period 2n − 1 but it is shift distinct from a.
(iv) All m-sequence of period 2n−1 are decimation equivalent, which means all m-sequences
with period 2n − 1 can be derived from one of them.
Let f(x) ∈ Pn(x), the first property in Property 2 indicates that if there are two
m-sequences a and b, ∀a,b ∈ G(f)∗, then a and b are shift-equivalent. In addition, if
two m-sequences are shift-equivalent, they must be generated by the same characteristic
polynomial. Furthermore, the second, the third and the last properties in Property 2
provide a method to generate all m-sequences with period 2n.
The m-sequence meets the three randomness postulates which are balance property, run
property and two-level correlation property [10]. The randomness properties of m-sequences
are shown below
Property 3. M-sequences have following randomness properties given in [5]
(i) Each nonzero n-tuple can be convected to a integer which occurs exactly once in one
period of an m-sequence of period 2n − 1.
(ii) Any m-sequences is balanced: each period of the sequence has 2n−1 one’s and 2n−1− 1
zero’s.
(iii) For 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 2, there are 2n−k−2 runs of 1’s (or 0’s) of length k. For other cases,
there is only one 0 run of 0’s of length n− 1 and one run of 1’s of length n.
(iv) Autocorrelation function of m-sequence a is 2-level, which is
AC(τ) =
{
2n − 1 τ ≡ 0(mod 2n − 1)
−1 τ 6≡ 0(mod 2n − 1).
The first property of m-sequence in Property 3 indicates that each n-tuple in m-
sequence with period 2n − 1 can be converted to a integer which does not appear twice in
one period.
3.4.2 Reciprocal Pairs of M-sequences
M -sequences collision will be analysed in m-sequence reciprocal pairs, so it is necessary
to make notation for reciprocal m-sequence pairs. The reciprocal polynomial of f(x) given
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in [11, Chapter 3.4.4] is defined as x
n
c0
f(x−1), and the expansion of f−1(x) is shown below
f−1(x) = xnf(x−1) = xn + c1xn−1 + · · ·+ cn−1x+ 1, ci ∈ GF (2n) (3.10)
that is, f−1(x) is got from reversing the order of the coefficients of f(x).
Assume m-sequence a is generated by the primitive polynomial f−1(x),
a = (a0, a1, . . . , aT−1, a0, a1, . . .)
and we define its reciprocal m-sequence a˜ is generated by the reciprocal primitive polyno-
mial f−1(x). Let
a˜ = b = (b0, b1, . . . , bT−1, b0, b1, . . .).
According to [7, Chapter 2.2], the reciprocal m-sequence b is defined as
bi = a(−i mod 2n−1), for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
Therefore, the reciprocal sequence a˜ is
a˜ = (a0, aT−1, . . . , a1, a0, aT−1, . . .).
Let b be a periodic sequence with period T ,
b = (b0, b1, . . . , bT−1, b0, b1, . . .)
then we define b−1 as the reverse of sequence b,
b−1 = (bT−1, bT−2, . . . , b0, bT−1, bT−2, . . .).
If b is not a periodic sequence and has finite length l,
b = (b0, b1, . . . , bl−1)
then we define b−1 as the reverse of sequence b,
b−1 = (bl−1, bl−2, . . . , b0).
For a reciprocal m-sequence pair which is a and a˜, the relation between the reciprocal
m-sequence a˜ and the reverse sequence a−1 is
a−1 = L1(a˜).
In summary, the relation between generated sequences a from f(x) and a−1 from f(x−1)
is defined as
a ∈ G(f) ⇐⇒ a−1 ∈ G(f−1).
The characteristic polynomials of any reciprocal m-sequence pairs, f(x) and f(x−1), will
never be the same.
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3.4.3 Buffalo Laboratories Application of Digitally Exact Spec-
tra (BLADES)
The basic structure of the BLADES system is shown in Figure 3.3. In detail, the output
bit stream of the first PRG on the top of the structure is a and the output bit stream of
the second PRG is b.
Figure 3.3: BLADES System
The upper bits-to-integers mapper converts each a[t, n] bits to an integer value fat ,
where t = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . .; similarly, the lower one converts each a[t, n] bits to an integer value
fbt , where t = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . ..
The next block in the middle of the figure is the selector and it’s the core of the BLADES
system. Assume the input indicator bit stream of the selector is Mt for t = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . .
and the output integer stream is ft for t = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . .. Then the relation between the
output and the inputs is ft = fat, ∀Mt = 0 and ft = fbt, ∀Mt = 1.
After the selector, the mixer send baseband signal with bandwidth W to the hopping
frequency fMi which is the center frequency of hopping slot. Assume the reference frequency
of the hopping system is f0 which is located at far left of the bandwidth Wss, and the total
FH bandwidth is Wss as shown on the right side of Figure 3.3. The basic idea of the
BLADES system can be summarized as
ft =
{
f0 +W ∗ fat Mt = 0
f0 +W ∗ fbt Mt = 1 (3.11)
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For security purpose, the pre-shared information used to generate pseudorandom num-
bers a and b are randomly picked and should be kept as secret keys of the sender and the
receiver. The jammer firstly needs to find the frequency of transmitting signal and then
send jamming signal to this frequency. This model be discussed in detail in Section 6.1.
If ∃t ≥ 0, fat = fbt , then the receiver could not despread the hopping frequency at
time i. Therefore collisions between two PRGs increase the BER. In order to reduce the
probability of occurrence of the collision, we need to analyse the collision properties of two
distinct binary primitive polynomials of the same degree. This could help us to figure out
how to select the best pairs to reduce the collision probabilityn. In brief, the motivation
of analyzing the collision properties in the BLADES system is to reduce the BER caused
by the collisions.
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Chapter 4
Implementation of OFDM Enc in
Software Defined Radio (SDR)
This chapter provides several basic concepts of SDR and the implementation of OFDM
Enc. In addition, the details of parameters setting in GNU radio for OFDM schemes
with OFDM Enc will be given. Section 4.1 introduces an overall structure for SDR and
data type in GNU radio. Section 4.2 demonstrates the implementation of IEEE 802.11a
OFDM system with OFDM Enc in GNU radio. Section 4.3 indicates the basic theory of
USRP-N210. Section 4.4 demonstrates the implementation of OFDM Enc in a multipath
AWGN model in GNU radio, and demonstrates the implementations of OFDM Enc on
USRP-N210 in DART-3300 and laboratory.
4.1 SDR Overall
The overall connection of SDR is shown in Figure 4.1. SDR has two main parts which
are Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) and GNU radio. USRP is the hardware
consisting of ADC, DAC, low pass filer and mixer. GNU radio is a digital signal processing
(DSP) software on Linux system. By setting up the Internet Protocol (IP) address in a
USRP block in GNU radio, GNU radio on personal computer (PC) can send and receive
sample data from USRP hardware devices. Physically, an ethernet cable creates a con-
nection between the USRP device and GNU radio. Since each USRP device has its own
subnet, the PC needs two network cards to connect two USRP devices at the same time.
Instead of using an gigabit ethernet switch [36], we use two gigabit ethernet adaptors to
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Figure 4.1: Software Defined Radio Physical Connection
connect two USRP devices separately and set up their own IP addresses and subnets. After
running SDR, the data transmission between USRP devices and GNU radio are recorded
in real-time. As a result, we can use the QT-GUI-frequency-sink block in GNU radio to
analyse the spectrum of the sampled data obtained from USRP devices in real-time.
4.1.1 Basic Theory of GNU Radio and GNU Radio Companion
GNU radio is a software working under GUN General Public License which is a copyleft
license and free to use. GNU radio contains lots of signal processing libraries and USRP
communication functions. Additionally, the GNU radio companion is a graphical software
combining those functions to form graphical intergraded blocks. By wiring those blocks and
setting the parameters inside those blocks, we can build a complete communication scheme
efficiently. It is similar to the Simulink in Matlab. In brief, the GNU radio companion
helps us focus on prototyping and signal processing graphically.
The GNU radio companion could run on Linux platform or Windows platform, but it
widely runs on Linux. In this thesis, the GNU radio companion Ver. 3.7.9 is running on
Ubuntu 16.04 OS which is further running on visual machine on Windows 10.
In Figure 4.1, GNU radio on a PC is used to process digital signals in a communication
system, and the connected USRP devices process the analogy signals. For the sender part
of SDR, the ethernet cable is used to transfer the discrete time sample data from GNU
radio to the USRP device on the left side of Figure 4.1. Afterwards, the USRP device
converts it into analogy signals and passes them through the low pass filter, the mixer and
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the antenna. For the receiver part of SDR, the USRP device on the right side of Figure 4.1
receives the analogy signal from its antenna and converts it to baseband signals. Finally,
the filtered signals will be converted into discrete time signal, then send to PC through the
ethernet cable.
4.1.2 Data Type in GNU Radio
There are five main data types used in GNU radio which are complex, float, byte, short
and integer. In detail,
• One integer contains 4 bytes.
• One short integer contains 2 bytes.
• One float number contains 32 bits.
• One complex number contains one 32-bit real float number and one 32-bit imaginary
float number.
In IEEE-754 floating point standard, each 32-bit float number contains 1-bit sign num-
ber at the most significant bit followed by 8-bit exponent numbers, and 23-bit man-
tissas. Let the 8-bit exponent numbers be [e7, e6, . . . , e
0] and the 23-bit mantissas be
[m1,m2, . . . ,m
23]. Then we have following relation
Sign ∈ {0, 1}
Exponent = −127 + (e7 · 27 + e6 · 26 + . . .+ e0 · 20)
Mantissa = m1 · 2−1 +m2 · 2−2 +m3 · 2−3 + . . .+m23 · 2−23
Decimal = 2Sign ∗ (2Exponent + Mantissa).
(4.1)
For example,
3fe00000hex = (−1)0 · (2−127+127 + 2−1 + 2−2) = 1.75dec.
IEEE-754 floating point numbers are operated in the format of least-significant-bits
(LSB) in GNU radio. In detail, the LSB format is actually the mirror of the most-
significant-bits (MSB) format. For example, if 3fe00000hex represents 1.75dec in MSB,
its mirror 0000e03fhex represents 1.75dec in LSB.
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Figure 4.2: OFDM Sender without Encryption
4.2 Implementation of OFDM Enc Encryption Scheme
in GNU Radio
The implementation of the OFDM Enc encryption scheme is given in this section. Firstly, it
demonstrates the implementation of OFDM system under IEEE802.11a standard without
OFDM Enc. Secondly, it demonstrates the implementation of OFDM Enc encryption.
Finally, it discusses the implementation of the decryption part of OFDM Enc.
4.2.1 Implementation of the General OFDM System without
OFDM Enc
The IEEE 802.11a OFDM sender’s structure without the OFDM Enc is shown in Figure
4.2. In detail, the message-source block in GNU radio is used to output bytes from a binary
file to its next block, and it is set to repeat sending the message bit stream automatically
during the test. Each 96 bytes from the file-source block will be tagged in the stream-
to-tagged-stream block. After that, the following blocks will manipulate each 96 message
bytes at a time. For example, the packet-header-generator block generates 48 header bytes
for each tagged message which is the tagged 96-byte.
The repack-bits block in Figure 4.2 operates 1-byte at a time. We define 1-byte input
in bit type as
a = (a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7).
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Figure 4.3: BPSK (Left) and QPSK (Right) Modulation for Each Input Byte
The repack-bits block converts each 2-bit to an decimal number,
d = (d0, d1, d2, d3).
After that, each decimal number will be converted to a byte b which is
b = (b0, b1, b2, b3).
The output of the repack-bits block is
b = (b3, b2, b1, b0)
which is in the endianness of LSB. Comparing the input a with the output b, it indicates
that each input byte corresponds to four output bytes, which explains that each 96-byte
input has 384-byte for the repack-bits block in Figure 4.2.
The BPSK-modulation block also converts each byte to a 8-byte complex number. In
detail, it maps bytes (00, 01)hex to complex numbers ((−1, 0), (1, 0))decimal as shown in the
left side of Figure 4.3.
Similarly, a QPSK-modulation block converts each byte input into a complex number.
In detail, it maps input bytes (00, 01, 02, 03)hex to output complex numbers ((−1/
√
2,
−1/√2), (1/√2, −1/√2), (−1/√2, 1/√2), (1/√2, 1/√2))decimal respectively as shown in
the right side of the signal constellation graph in Figure 4.3.
The multiplexing (MUX) block is used to combine each 48-complex header and 384-
complex payload at a time. Therefore, the output of MUX block is 432 complex numbers
in total, and it will be sent to the OFDM-carrier-allocator block.
The OFDM-carrier-allocator block in Figure 4.2 creates 11 complex vectors for each
432 complex numbers input, and those vectors are shown in Figure 4.4. The complex vec-
tors are labeled as Mi for i = 1, 2, . . . , 11, and each vector contains 64 complex numbers
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Figure 4.4: Complex Number Stream after the OFDM Carrier Manipulator Block
as 64 subcarriers, where M1 and M2 are two synchronization words. Additionally, each
header prime and each message prime in Figure 4.4 come from the header and message data
after inserted 4 pilot carriers and 0 DC subcarrier. Namely, the pilot complex numbers
[1, 1, 1,−1] are inserted into the subcarriers [−21,−7, 7, 21] respectively for each 64 sub-
carriers. Furthermore, the subcarriers from −32 to −27 and from 27 to 31 and subcarrier
0 are set to be complex value zeros. Thus, the format of subcarriers exactly matches the
IEEE 802.11 standard in Figure 3.1.
The IFFT size in IFFT block is set to 64, so that IFFT block manipulates each 64
complex subcarriers at a time. In detail, it converts each 64 complex numbers which are
discrete samples in frequency domain to 64 complex numbers which are discrete samples
in time domain.
The CP block inserts 16 complex numbers CP at the beginning of the each 64 complex
numbers input. The prefix is the copy of the last 16 complex numbers of the 64 complex
numbers. The process is demonstrated in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Cyclic Prefix before Each 64 Complex Numbers
The multiply-const block is used to multiply each input complex number by a constant
number in order to adjust the gain of signals. The constant number is set from 0.01 to 0.03
for the implementation by using USRPs. In other words, if the constant number is lower
than 0.01, then the SNR will be too small. In contrast, if constant number is higher than
0.03, the USRP will be saturated for high SNR. SDR will get high BER for both situations.
Note that this constant number is the reference number for USRP devices which may not
be linearly proportion to the sending signal’s power, and its range is not accurate for each
USRP device. Finally, the tag-gate block is used to remove the tag which is an internal
variable passed by blocks.
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The USRP-sink block in the GNU radio companion provides an interface to setup the
parameters of the USRP device. In detail, the USRP block has parameters IP address,
center frequency and sample rate. In our experiments, the USRP-sink block is used to
set the parameters for the USRP sender. Its IP is set to be addr = 192.168.10.2, the
center frequency 892MHz, the sample rate 195.312kHz. Similarly, USRP-source block is
the receiver which has the same parameter as the sender except that the IP is set to be
adr = 192.168.30.2.
4.2.2 Implementation of OFDM Enc Encryption in OFDM Sys-
tem
According to the OFDM Enc encryption scheme given in [17], the scheme uses two key
stream bits to encrypt one complex number after the IFFT. However, it did not consider
whether the OFDM Enc should be done before adding the CP or after adding the CP.
From Figure 4.2, we can see that the CP block is inserted between the IFFT and the
USRP-sink block, so we first determine whether the OFDM Enc should be inserted before
the CP block or after the CP block.
We propose that the OFDM Enc should be inserted between the IFFT block and CP
block, because it saves double length of CP in key bits. For instance, for a block of 64
symbols in the OFDM system if we put OFDM Enc after the CP block, it needs 128 bits
to encrypt 64 complex numbers at the IFFT output. However, if we put OFDM Enc after
the CP block, it firstly uses 32 bits to encrypt the CP and then uses 128 bits to encrypt
the 64 complex numbers.
Based on the analysis, putting OFDM Enc between the IFFT block and CP block saves
32 key bits for each 64 complex number inputs, as shown in Figure 4.6. Note that the add
block, subtract block and file sink block are used to generate key stream for the use in
decryption at the receiver side. In general, we have the following property.
Property 4. For OFDM system with a block of N symbols, the encryption needs 2N key
stream bits to encrypt it if OFDM Enc is placed between IFFT output and CP. It needs
2len(CP ) + 2N key stream bits if OFDM Enc is placed after CP where len(CP ) is the
length of CP.
The vector-to-stream block converts a vector to a stream. The reason to use this block
is the following OFDM Enc encryption scheme can only operates float stream in GNU
radio. In detail, the LFSR block can only output float number stream which is viewed as
a stream in GNU radio.
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Figure 4.6: OFDM Encryption placed between the IFFT Block and the Cyclic Prefix Block
The complex-to-float block divides each input complex number into a 32-bit float real
number and a 32-bit float imaginary number. Then the real part and imaginary part are
multiplied by the two key streams from the two LFSR separately for simplicity and test
purpose.
The first LFSR block outputs 32-bit float number 0000803F and 000080BF in hex in
LSB, which represents 1 and −1 in decimal respectively. Note that {0, 1} over GF(2) is
mapped to the {−1, 1} in this case. Assume the primitive polynomial over GF (2) of degree
n is
c0 + c1x+ c2x
2 + ...+ cn−1xn−1 + xn.
In the LFSR block, the degree is set to be 12 and the mask is set to be 3232 which is
the integer representation of the corresponding primitive polynomial’s coefficients. By
converting the integer 3232 into binary numbers, we have the coefficients,
(c0, c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, c8, c9, c10, c11) = (1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
then the corresponding primitive polynomial is
1 + x+ x4 + x6 + x12.
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Its corresponding LFSR is shown in Figure 4.7. Additionally, the seed in the LFSR block
is used to set the initials state of the LFSR. The initial output of the LFSR block is
(a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8, a9, a10, a11) = (1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1, 1,−1, 1,−1,−1, 1).
Figure 4.7: Linear Feedback Shift Register with Primitive Polynomial 1 +x+x4 +x6 +x12
For simplicity, the second LFSR is the same as the first one but it has different initials
state. The initial output of the second LFSR block will be
(a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8, a9, a10, a11) = (−1, 1,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1, 1,−1, 1,−1,−1).
4.2.3 Implementation of OFDM Decryption
The frequency-sink block in GNU radio is used to analyse the spectrum power at both
sender and receiver. It is a 1024-FFT block with the sampling rate of 195.312kHz. By
using this block, we could get the power spectrum of the discrete time samples. At the
receiver side, we could use the spectrums to calculate the SNR for analysing multipath
delay effect in AWGN model in GNU radio. In other words, SNR is derived by subtracting
noise power in dB from received signal power in dB in AWGN channel.
The 1024-FFT block works as probe and connects to the place after the gain-control
block in Figure 4.2. The captured frequency is defined as sending frequency. Similarly, add
the same block at the receiver side between the USRP block and OFDM Enc decryption
as shown in Figure 4.8 to measure the spectrum power of the received signal.
The delay block is to pad complex number zeros before the complex sample data in
order to match the key bits and the samples. Actually, the mismatch generally happens
at the beginning of the transmission in our case.
The file-source block in Figure 4.8 outputs key stream bits at the OFDM sender side.
The complex-to-float block converts complex number stream to two float key stream bits,
which are used for decrypting real part and imaginary part of the samples respectively.
The OFDM demodulation procedures included header detector, FFT, frame equalizer,
OFDM serializer, underlying demodulation and repack are put in one block as shown in
Figure 4.8 for simplicity. The file-sink block in Figure 4.8 is used to save the demodulated
message bytes, and it is used to get BER by comparing with the original sending data.
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Figure 4.8: OFDM Receiver
4.3 Parameters and Basic Properties of Universal Soft-
ware Radio Peripheral (USRP)
USRP is a communication field programmable gate array (FPGA) board. In the imple-
mentation, we use N210 motherboard from Ettus ResearchTMas USRP. The N210 has dual
ADC convertors which can sample up to 100 MS/s. Also it has dual DAC convertors
sampled up to 400 MS/s. By using the Gigabit ethernet, it creates a 50 MS/s connec-
tion between the USRP device and GNU radio. Furthermore, FLEX-900 radio frequency
(RF) daughterboard and vertical antenna VERT900 are used in order to transmit high
frequency signal between 824 MHz and 960MHz. FLEX900 RF daughterboard is inserted
into N210, and it is also manufactured by Ettus ResearchTM. Additionally, the FLEX-900
daughterboard provides two RF ports that one is used for transceiver and the other one
is used for receiving signals only. In our implementation, we use the former one on two
USRP devices.
The USRP sender generates discrete time signal in continuous time based on each input
complex number c˜[n]. After that, it passes those time domain pulses to a low-pass filter
to form OFDM baseband signal. In fact, low-pass filter is used to window the frequency
domain spectrum in order to shape the pulses in time domain. The low-pass filter function
is a window function in frequency domain as shown in Equation (4.2). It is equivalent to
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Figure 4.9: AWGN Channel in GNU Radio
do the convolution between time domain signal and sinc function.
LP (ω/2piW ) =
{
0 |ω| > piW
1 |ω| < piW. (4.2)
Finally, the real part and the imaginary part signal will be up-converted by 892 MHz
cosine and sine carriers respectively.
4.4 Tests of OFDM Enc
This section describes the test procedures for OFDM Enc in detail. The tests of OFDM Enc
in multipath AWGN channel model in GNU Radio are given in Section 4.4.1. Additionally,
Section 4.4.2 demonstrates the test procedures in DART-3300 and laboratory environment.
4.4.1 Tests of OFDM Enc in Multipath Additive White Gaussian
Noise (AWGN) Channel Model in GNU Radio
By replacing the two USRP blocks by a AWGN-channel-model block and combining the
structures from Figures 4.6 and 4.8, we can implement the OFDM system with OFDM
Enc in a simulated multipath AWGN channel. The AWGN-channel-model block is shown
in Figure 4.9.
The AWGN-channel-model block has two useful parameters which are multipath FIR
taps and AWGN noise voltage. The FIR taps are used to simulate the multipath delay,
and the noise voltage is used to simulate AWGN. Other factors including frequency offset
in Figure 4.9 are not used.
The implementation in this section contains three cases. The first case is multipath
delay without AWGN. The second case is multipath delay with AWGN and adjust SNR
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to be 18.8 dB. The third case is multipath delay with AWGN and adjust SNR to be 20.1
dB. In the implementation, OFDM with and without OFDM Enc are both tested in order
to compare the performance. The initial FIR taps for all three implementation are set to
be [α0, α1] = [0.799, 0.201] which are the normalized values of the first two taps of [0.74,
0.19, 0.07] given in [36]. The reason to use only two taps is that two taps [0.74, 0.19] has
less effect on the system than that of using three taps [0.74, 0.19, 0.07].
The details of the three cases are shown as below.
(i) Case 1. We set the AWGN voltage to be 0 in the AWGN-channel-model block to
investigate the pure multipath effect on the OFDM system with the OFDM Enc
encryption scheme. By gradually increasing the taps ratio α0/α1, we measure and
record the BER. After that, remove the OFDM Enc in the OFDM system and do
the same process to collect those data points. Finally, the BER versus the taps ratio
α0/α1 will be plotted in order to show the boundary of the multipath effect on OFDM
Enc.
(ii) Case 2. We set the AWGN voltage to be 200u and adjust the gain-control block
at the sender to meet SNR = 18.8 dB. Then we do the same procedure as in the
first case to collect data points (BER,α0/α1) from the system with and without the
OFDM Enc encryption scheme. Finally, we plot those data in the same figure as in
case one.
(iii) Case 3. We keep the same AWGN noise as in the second case and adjust the gain to
meet SNR 20.1 dB. Then we do the same procedure as in the first case to collect data
points (BER,α0/α1) from the system with and without the OFDM Enc encryption
scheme. Finally, we plot those data in the same figure as in case (i).
4.4.2 Tests in Microwave Anechoic Chamber DART-3300 and
Lab Environment
The microwave anechoic chamber DART-3300 has two build-in polarized wideband antenna
named ANT-3A which can transmit and receive signals with frequency from 700 MHz to
6 GHz. The overall setup demonstration is shown in Figure 4.11. The communication
medium in DART-3300 has almost no noise. In other words, the transmitting signal in
it will not suffer any significant channel effects like multipath delay. Furthermore, the
radiation absorbent material is used to build the internal wall of the chamber, so that any
RF signal propagate though the wall will be absorbed and no reflection. Additionally, the
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outside wall of the chamber is welded by multiple sheet metals in order to isolate the noise
from outside.
We have following changes on the OFDM system with the OFDM Enc encryption
scheme.
(i) The OFDM Enc encryption scheme in Figure 4.6 is moved to the place after the
gain-control block.
(ii) The combination in Figure 4.10 is used to replace the two LFSR blocks in Figure 4.6
for the encryption.
(iii) The combinations in Figure 4.10 is used to replace the file-source block in Figure 4.8
for the decryption.
(iv) Use a filter sink to save sample data from the USRP receiver in Figure 4.8 to a file.
After finished receiving, we replace the USRP-sink block in Figure 4.8 by a sources-
file block. The sources-file block can output the saved data from the file. After that,
we could use the same data many times for decryption and demodulation.
Figure 4.10: Customized Key Stream Generator: Constant Sources and Stream MUX
The combination of a stream-MUX block and multiple constant sources shown in Figure
4.10 forms a key stream generator. In detail, the stream-MUX block combines each input
and repeat output. The number of input ports of the stream-MUX block can be defined
in the setting. In Figure 4.10, the number of inputs is 6, then it repeatedly outputs its
six inputs (1,−1, 1, 1, 1,−1). Therefore, the file-sink block which is used to store the key
stream in Figure 4.6 is not used in the implementation in this section.
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The reason we made those changes is that we need to find the problems in the implemen-
tation. The lost sample data in the received samples at the beginning of the transmission
will cause mismatch between sample data and key stream. Therefore, using simpler key
bits and move the OFDM Enc after the CP is for the align in decryption. By using lower
period of key, we can simply shift the received sample data to match the key stream. The
delay block in Figure 4.8 is used to pad zeros in front of the saved data in order to solve
the mismatch problem. The total number of possible shifts is the period of the key stream.
Figure 4.11: SDR Setup in Chamber DART-3300
The above procedure can be described in mathematical formula. Assume the received
sample data are y′0, y
′
1, y
′
2, · · · . The delay block in GNU radio is used to pad complex
number zeros before the data. In detail, n delay means padding n complex zeros before
the data. Assume the key stream for the encryption has period T . Generally, if the indexes
of the lost sample data at the beginning of transmission in the received file are
q + Tk, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , where q ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , T − 1}.
Then the delay time in the delay block in Figure 4.8 should set to be q in order to solve
the mismatch. However, during the implementation in both lab and DART-3300, we do
not know the value of q, so that the best way is to reduce the period of the key stream and
put the OFDM Enc after the CP as discussed above. After that, the mismatch problem
can be solved by doing a total of q tests. Each test is done by setting q = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T − 1
in the delay block respectively. After that, the best BER in those q tests is recorded.
For example, if the key period is 7, the seven tests will have following data streams
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after the delay block.
y′0, y
′
1, y
′
2, . . .
0 + 0i, y′0, y
′
1, y
′
2, . . .
0 + 0i, 0 + 0i, y′0, y
′
1, y
′
2, . . .
...
0 + 0i, 0 + 0i, 0 + 0i, 0 + 0i, 0 + 0i, 0 + 0i, y′0, y
′
1, y
′
2, . . . .
The implementation in the DART-3300 and in the lab environment each has two ex-
perimental groups, and each group has 6 cases. The first experimental group for each test
place has 6 cases as shown in each row below
Case 1: k1 = k2 = (1,−1)
Case 2: k1 = k2 = (1,−1, 1)
Case 3: k1 = k2 = (1,−1,−1, 1)
Case 4: k1 = k2 = (1,−1,−1, 1, 1)
Case 5: k1 = k2 = (1,−1, 1, 1, 1,−1)
Case 6: k1 = k2 = (1,−1, 1, 1, 1,−1,−1)
The second experimental group for each test place has 6 cases as shown in each row below
Case 1: k1 = (−1, 1), k2 = (1,−1)
Case 2: k1 = (−1,−1, 1), k2 = (−1, 1,−1)
Case 3: k1 = (−1,−1, 1,−1), k2 = (−1,−1, 1, 1)
Case 4: k1 = (1,−1,−1, 1, 1), k2 = (−1,−1,−1, 1, 1)
Case 5: k1 = (1,−1, 1, 1, 1,−1), k2 = (1,−1,−1, 1, 1,−1)
Case 6: k1 = (1,−1, 1, 1, 1,−1,−1), k2 = (−1, 1,−1, 1, 1, 1,−1)
The gain control coefficient is set from 0.01 to 0.03 with step 0.001. During the test,
we found the OFDM system without OFDM Enc could demodulate correctly for the entire
gain range. Implementations in the laboratory use the two USRP devices with VERT900
antennas. The two USRP devices are put on the same table and are one meter away.
Afterwards, implementations in the DART-3300 use built-in ANT-3A antennas.
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Chapter 5
Analysis and Implementation Results
of OFDM Enc
This chapter provides the analysis and implementation results of OFDM Enc. The mul-
tipath boundary and the implementation results from the lab and the chamber are given
and discussed in detail.
5.1 Multipath Delay Boundary in OFDM Enc
This section discusses the implementation results in GNU radio. It demonstrates the
multipath delay boundary from the implementation of the OFDM system with OFDM
Enc encryption scheme in detail.
5.1.1 Multipath Delay Analysis
The three FIR taps given in [36] demonstrated the three paths between the transmitter
and receiver in their lab environment. Assume the three FIR taps are [α0, α1, α2] and are
fixed numbers. By setting h to be 3 in Equation (3.6), we could get Equation (5.1).
y′k =
∑2
i=0 αix
′
k−i + βk, k ≥ k − i ≥ 0
=
∑2
i=0 αi(a
′
k−i + jb
′
k−i) + βk, k ≥ k − i ≥ 0.
(5.1)
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In detail, the expansion of Equation (5.1) is shown below
y′0 = α0x
′
0 + β0
y′1 = α0x
′
1 + α1x
′
0 + β1
y′2 = α0x
′
2 + α1x
′
1 + α2x
′
0 + β2
y′3 = α0x
′
3 + α1x
′
2 + α2x
′
1 + β3
...
y′k = α0x
′
k + α1x
′
k−1 + α2x
′
k−2 + βk.
(5.2)
At the receiver side, the OFDM Enc decryption yields that yk = Dec(y
′
k). The yk is
shown as
y˜k = Dec(y
′
k)
= Dec(
2∑
i=0
αi(a
′
k−i + jb
′
k−i) + βk)
= Dec(α0(a
′
k + jb
′
k) + α1(a
′
k−1 + jb
′
k−1) + α2(a
′
k−2 + jb
′
k−2) + βk)
= uk(α0a
′
k + α1a
′
k−1 + α2a
′
k−2 + βk) + vk(jα0b
′
k + jα1b
′
k−1 + jα2b
′
k−2)
= α0(ak + jbk) + β
′
k + uk(α1a
′
k−1 + α2a
′
k−2) + vk(jα1b
′
k−1 + jα2b
′
k−2) (5.3)
where β′k = ukβk.
If there is no OFDM Enc encryption scheme in the OFDM system, the OFDM receiver
demodulates the samples α0(ak + jbk) +α1(ak−1 + jbk−1) +α2(ak−2 + jbk−2) +βk. However,
if OFDM Enc is built in OFDM scheme, then the OFDM demodulator has to demodulate
the result of Equation (5.3). The problem is we do not know whether the OFDM system
can demodulate the part uk(α1a
′
k−1 + α2a
′
k−2) + vk(jα1b
′
k−1 + jα2b
′
k−2) or not. Therefore,
it is necessary to compare the effect of multipath delay between the OFDM system with
the OFDM Enc encryption and the system without the encryption scheme.
5.1.2 Results under Pure Multipath without AWGN
The multipath boundary on the IEEE 802.11a OFDM system with the OFDM Enc en-
cryption scheme is shown in the dashed line marked as triangles in Figure 5.1, and the
multipath boundary on the system without the encryption scheme is shown in the dashed
line marked as diamonds at the bottom. Based on those two lines, we have the following
observations.
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(i) For the pure multipath effect without AWGN, the BER of the system without the
encryption scheme is always zero, which means the multipath effect does not have
any effect on it.
(ii) As the taps ratio α0/α1 increases, the BER of the system with the encryption scheme
decreases quickly. After the ratio reaches 6.19, the corresponding BER is around
8.66× 10−7. The precise data is shown in Table A.1.
(iii) Once the ratio α0/α1 reaches the ratio of the first two taps of [0.74, 0.19, 0.07] given
by [36], the system with the encryption cannot deliver useful information.
Based on these observations, we found that if the multipath delay effect happens on
the system in practice, it will dramatically decrease the performance of the OFDM system
with the OFDM Enc encryption scheme.
5.1.3 Results under Multipath with AWGN
In this section, both multipath delay effect and AWGN in the channel model block are used
in order to have more practical results. In detail, we adjust the SNR to be 18.8 dB. The
plot of BER versus the FIR taps ratio for the OFDM system with the encryption scheme
is the solid line marked as triangles in Figure 5.1. The plot of BER versus the FIR taps
ratio for the OFDM system without the encryption is marked as rectangles in Figure 5.1.
When set the SNR to be 20.1 dB, the plots of BER versus FIR taps ratio are marked as
rounds and stars in Figure 5.1 for the OFDM system with the encryption and the system
without the encryption respectively.
From Figure 5.1, we have following observations
(i) As the increase of SNR, it pushes the line closer to the multipath boundary.
(ii) Under the same SNR, the system without the encryption always gets much better
BER at the lower taps ratio α0/α1 then that of the system with the encryption.
(iii) Even with infinity signal power, the system with the encryption cannot get lower
BER than that on the dashed line marked as triangles for the same taps ratio.
In summary, multipath delay creates a BER boundary in the OFDM system with the
OFDM Enc encryption scheme. If we view the multipath parameters given by [36] as a
reference in practice, it might be hard to get higher ratio α0/α1 in our lab environment
than that in their lab.
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Figure 5.1: Multipath BER Versus Taps Ratio
5.2 Implementation Results
This section gives and discusses the test results from DART-3300 and the laboratory en-
vironment.
5.2.1 32-bit Data Flow of OFDM Enc from GNU Radio Imple-
mentation
The data flows of the OFDM Enc encryption from GNU radio are shown in Table 5.1.
In detail, the 32-bit float data before the vector-to-stream block and the date after the
stream-to-vector block have been captured by two file-sink blocks respectively. There are
four columns in Table 5.1 which are input data from the vector-to-stream block, output
data from the stream-to-vector block and two key streams from the first LFSR block and
the second LFSR block. All data in the table have already been converted to decimal
numbers from 32-bit float numbers and complex float numbers which are in the endianness
of LSB. The real part of the output data is the result of multiplying the real part of input
data by the output of the first LFSR block. Similarly, we can multiply the imaginary part
of input data by the output of the second LFSR block to get the imaginary part of output
data. Comparing to the data given in [17], we can see that the implementation results
match the theory.
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OFDM Enc(All Data in Decimal)
Input Data LFSR 1 LFSR 2 Output Data
32-bit float
Real
32-bit float
Imag
32-bit float 32-bit float 32-bit float
Real
32-bit float
Imag
2.828427 0 1 −1 2.828427 0
−4.123229 11.220899 −1 1 4.123229 11.220899
−2.351751 2.903550 −1 −1 2.351751 −2.903550
−1.698666 2.050345 −1 −1 1.698666 −2.050345
−6.308644 5.860302 −1 −1 6.308644 −5.860302
3.649297 4.588861 −1 −1 −3.649297 −4.588861
0.551799 2.123189 1 −1 0.551799 −2.123189
−2.760114 −6.491563 −1 1 2.760114 −6.491563
6 −4 1 −1 6 4
7.482303 5.606011 −1 1 −7.482303 5.606011
2.774080 −0.422328 −1 −1 −2.774080 0.422328
−4.531216 −0.472989 1 −1 −4.531216 0.472989
Table 5.1: Data Flow of the OFDM Enc
5.2.2 Implementation Results of OFDM Enc in DART-3300
The implementation in DART-3300 indicates that the OFDM system with the OFDM Enc
encryption scheme can only demodulate correctly for the gain coefficient at 0.017 for the
6 cases in experimental group 1. For all 6 cases in group 2, the file-sink block after the
demodulation did not capture anything for the gain coefficient set from 0.01 to 0.03 with
step 0.001.
The first and second columns in Figure 5.2 represent the spectrums obtained from two
1024-FFT blocks respectively before and after the OFDM Enc encryption at the transmitter
side. The third and fourth column in Figure 5.2 indicates the spectrums obtained from two
1024-FFT blocks respectively before and after the OFDM Enc decryption at the receiver
side.
Each row in Figure 5.2 provides the spectrum for a choice of two key streams. In detail,
the two key streams used from row 1 to row 5 satisfy k1 = k2, which are (1,−1),(1,−1, 1),
(1,−1,−1, 1),(1,−1,−1, 1, 1), (1,−1, 1, 1, 1,−1),(1,−1, 1, 1, 1,−1,−1) respectively. The
two key streams for the last row are different, i.e., k1 6= k2 where k1 = [1,−1, 1, 1, 1,−1,−1]
and k2 = [−1, 1,−1, 1, 1, 1,−1].
For the implementation in DART-3300, the BER for the six rows in Figure 5.2 is
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(0, 0.143, 0.0409, 0.0265, 0.328, 0.123, 0.5) obtained by comparing the message before the
modulation and the message after the demodulation. Actually, the message before the
OFDM modulation and the demodulated message are captured in binary comparison mode
in Appendix C.
Figure 5.2 indicates the spectrums’ power before and after the OFDM Enc encryption
are −55 dB, and the spectrums’ power before and after the OFDM Enc decryption are
−65 dB. From Figure 5.2, we have following observations.
(i) The second column of Figure 5.2 indicates that the spectrum after the OFDM Enc
encryption becomes flat as the length of the key bits increases.
(ii) The third column indicates that the received spectrums before the OFDM Enc de-
cryption are similar to the original sent spectrum, which is the second column, except
that the received power dropped to around 10 dB due to the transmission loss.
(iii) Comparing the first column with the fourth column indicates that spectrums after the
OFDM decryption are recovered back to the original spectrums before the encryption
for the first five rows in Figure 5.2. In opposition, the last row of the fourth column
is still flat, and the file sink block at the receiver side did not capture anything after
the demodulator.
(iv) The second column verifies that each of the 64 subcarriers are occupied if the period
of the key stream is long enough.
The left side messages of Figure C.2 in Appendix C are the fragments of transmitted
messages before the OFDM modulation. The right side messages of Figure C.2 are frag-
ments of the received messages after the demodulation. Additionally, the highlighted parts
in those figures indicate that the transmitted messages are either lost or changed. In detail,
if both sides have highlight parts at the same corresponding location, then it is defined as
changed bytes. If the highlight part only occurs at one side and the corresponding same
location at the other side is empty, then it is defined as the lost bytes or inserted bytes.
Furthermore, if the receiver cannot recognize the header information of a received frame,
then it might be discarded.
5.2.3 Implementation Results of OFDM Enc in Laboratory
The implementation in the laboratory indicates that the OFDM system with the OFDM
Enc encryption scheme can only demodulate correctly for the first five cases in the exper-
imental group 1 with the gain coefficient of 0.017. For the last case in the experimental
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Figure 5.2: Spectrums of the OFDM System with OFDM Enc in the Chamber
group 1 and all cases in group 2, the file-sink block after the demodulation did not capture
anything for the gain coefficient set from 0.01 to 0.03 with step 0.001.
The implementation results in the lab are shown in Figure 5.3 which has the same
format as Figure 5.2 determined from the chamber, and keys are the same as the case in
the chamber.
For the implementation in the lab, the best bit error rate for the six rows in Figure
5.3 are (0, 0.189, 0.135, 0.0288, 0.3482, 0.5, 0.5) obtained by comparing the messages before
the modulation and the received messages after the demodulation. Actually, the messages
before the OFDM modulation and the demodulated messages are capture in binary com-
parison mode in Appendix C. From Figure 5.3 and the corresponding BER, we have the
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Figure 5.3: Spectrums of the OFDM System with OFDM Enc in the Lab
following observations.
(i) The spectrums’ power before and after the OFDM Enc encryption are −55 dB, and
the spectrums’ power before and after the OFDM Enc decryption are −65 dB.
(ii) The spectrums after the OFDM Enc encryption become flat as the period of the key
bits increases.
(iii) At the receiver side, the third column indicates the received spectrums before the
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OFDM Enc decryption are similar to the original sent spectrum which is the sec-
ond column except that the received power dropped to around 10 dB due to the
transmission loss.
(iv) Comparing the first column and the fourth column, it indicates that spectrum after
the OFDM decryption is recovered back to the original spectrums before the encryp-
tion for first four rows. In opposite, the last two rows of the fourth column are still
flat, and the file sink block at the receiver side did not capture anything after the
demodulator for these two cases.
(v) The second column verified that the entire 64 subcarriers are occupied if the random-
ness of the key stream is high enough, which agrees with the frequency mask property
of the OFDM encryption scheme given in [17].
(vi) Case 6 in group 1 in the chamber has much better BER than that of Case 6 in the
lab.
(vii) The BER is 0.5 for all 6 cases in experimental group 2 in the lab. From experimental
group 1 and group 2, if the two key streams in the encryption are different, the BER
will be 0.5.
(viii) The BER from the implementation of the OFDM without the OFDM Enc encryp-
tion scheme is significant low, and it does not have any bit errors in five minutes
communication in both chamber and lab environment.
Bit Error Rate from the Implementations
Cases Chamber Laboratory
k1 = k2 = (1,-1) 0 0
k1 = k2 = (1,-1,1) 0.143 0.189
k1 = k2 = (1,-1,-1,1) 0.0409 0.135
k1 = k2 = (1,-1,-1,1,1) 0.265 0.0288
k1 = k2 = (1,-1,1,1,1,-1) 0.328 0.348
k1 = k2 = (1,-1,1,1,1,-1,-1) 0.123 0.5
k1 = (1,-1,1,1,1,-1,-1), k2 = (-1,1,-1,1,1,1,-1) 0.5 0.5
Table 5.2: Bit Error Rate from the Implementations in Both the Chamber and the Lab
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5.2.4 Observation of OFDM Enc
Based on the tests results in both the lab and the chamber, the BER of the 7 cases
discussed above is summarized in Table 5.2. The BER for each case in the lab is higher
than the BER for each cases in the chamber respectively under the same SDR setting.
In detail, the BER from Case 2 to Case 6 in group 1 are 0.189, 0.135,0.0288, 0.3482, 0.5,
which are higher than those of 0.143, 0.0409, 0.0265,0.328,0.123 obtained from the chamber
respectively. Additionally, results of using two different m-sequences in OFDM Enc always
give 0.5 on BER in either lab or chamber. Finally, based on the simulations in GNU
radio and implementations by USRP, the multipath boundary significantly decreases the
performance of the OFDM Enc in practice. If the multipath ratio is lower than the desired
BER point on the boundary, the OFDM system with OFDM Enc cannot achieve lower
BER than that on the boundary even though the system has infinite SNR. The results
also indicate that the OFDM system with OFDM Enc has much higher BER than that
of the OFDM system without OFDM Enc if the multipath ratio is much lower than the
boundary.
Since the chamber is an isolated environment without any channel effects, it is con-
jectured that there exist some unknown factors causing high BER in the chamber. One
possible factor is the pilot symbols which are inserted in the subcarriers at [-7,-7,7,21]. For
the tests in both the chamber and the lab, the OFDM Enc encrypted the pilot symbols at
the sender side, then the pilot symbols may not contain proper channel information after
the decryption at the receiver side. This causes the problem in the channel estimation. The
second factor could be the noises in USRP deceives. If the OFDM Enc scheme is sensitive
to phase noises or frequency offset generated by the USRP devices, then it could also cause
high BER during the transmission. The third factor might be the synchronization issue
between the transmitter and the receiver. The unsynchronized data at the receiver side
may cause misalign between the received data and the key streams during the decryption
process. Then the received encrypted data could not be decrypted properly, then it cause
high BER after the demodulation.
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Chapter 6
A New Frequency Hopping (FH)
System
BLADES system was proposed in the middle of 1950s and successfully implemented in
1963 as the first working FH system in the world [5, 32, 34]. Based on the structure
of BLADES given in Section 3.4.3, we propose a new frequency hopping system named
randomly selective m-sequence based BLADES (RSMB) system in this chapter. Section
6.1 introduces the system model of the m-sequences based BLADES system and jammer.
Section 6.2 gives the collision properties of two distinct binary primitive polynomials of
the same degree in detail. Finally, Section 6.3 demonstrates the simulation results and two
conjectures for the collision properties. In this chapter, we keep the notation introduced
in Section 3.4 in Chapter 3.
6.1 System Model of M-sequences Based BLADES
System and Jammer
Randomly selective m-sequence based BLADES system uses original BLADES system
model given in [5, 32, 34], but it randomly selects two shift distinct m-sequences as key
streams. Consider an FH system where Ψ denotes the set of the available hopping fre-
quencies. To simplify the notation, each available hopping frequency is represented by
an integer value which belongs to the integer set Ψ. In detail, we denote ft ∈ Ψ as the
hopping frequency at time slot t, t ≥ 0, and the transmission starts from time slot 0. In
Figure 3.3, use this notation we know that Ψ = {1, 2, 3, . . . , 2n − 1}. Before time slot 0,
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both the transmitter and the receiver know ft based on their pre-shared secret information.
However, jammer does not know this information, so it cannot generate ft; therefore, ft is
a random variable for the jammer.
In order to jam the system, the jammer has two phases: discover phase and jamming
phase. The jammer starts the discover phase by selecting a set F (F ⊂ Ψ) of frequencies
before time slot 0, and keeps monitoring F starting from time slot 0. (Assume that the
jammer can control the elements in F while |F | is fixed due to jammer’s limited power.)
Once ft′ falls into F (i.e., ft′ ∈ F ) at a certain time slot t′, the jammer has successfully
discovered the hopping frequency, and has been able to predict ft for t > t
′. In this case,
the jammer terminates the discover phase and starts the jamming phase by jamming the
system from time slot t′ + 1.
In RSMB system, assume that Ψ = {1, 2, . . . , 2n − 1}. There are two PRGs, which
are f(x) and g(x) (randomly selected from Pn(x)), used for generating two m-sequences
respectively. Before starting the transmission at time slot 0, the transmitter and the
receiver pre-share two m-sequences, say a ∈ G(f) and b ∈ G(g), for generating hopping
frequencies. To be specific, at time slot t, t ≥ 0, ft is determined by a[t, n] if the t-th
sending bit is 0; otherwise, ft is determined by b[t, n].
1 Then, the transmitter sends some
signal to the receiver at hopping frequency ft.
As to the receiver, if any transmission is detected at hopping frequency a[t, n] but not
at b[t, n] at time slot t, t ≥ 0, the receiving bit will be identified as bit 0; if any transmission
is detected at b[t, n] but not at a[t, n], the receiving bit will be identified as bit 1; however,
if transmission is detected at both a[t, n] and b[t, n], the receiver is confused about the
receiving bit, which is identified as a receiving failure. The receiving failure can be caused
by either of two reasons:
(i) The jammer sends interference signal.
(ii) The collision happens between a and b, where if a[t, n] = b[t, n] for t ≥ 0, a[t, n] is
regarded as a collision between a and b.
1As each n-tuple of bits in both a and b is one-to-one mapped to an element in Ψ, we also use n-tuple
of bits, such as a[t, n], to refer to the hopping frequency.
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6.2 Collision Properties of Two Distinct Binary Prim-
itive Polynomials of the Same Degree
As discussed in Section 6.1, collisions between two m-sequences in the BLADES system
will confuse the receiver. If two key streams generate the same bit at time moment k, then
the receiver cannot figure out the sending bit based on the hopping frequency at the time
slot k. The result is that the receiver has to randomly guess the bit, which increases the
BER. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the collision properties of two distinct binary
primitive polynomials of the same degree.
Definition 3. ∀f(x) 6= g(x) ∈ Pn(x), let
coll(a,b) = {a[k, n] : 0 ≤ k < N, a[k, n] = b[k, n]},∀a ∈ G(f),b ∈ G(g)
denote the set of collisions between a and b. In addition, denote the set of collided sequence
pairs between G(f)∗ and G(g)∗ as
coll(f, g) = {(a,b) : a ∈ G(f)∗,b ∈ G(g)∗, coll(a,b) 6= ∅}
and define the collision probability between f(x) and g(x) as
Pcoll(f, g) =
|coll(f, g)|
|G(f)∗| · |G(g)∗| =
|coll(f, g)|
N2
.
6.2.1 Upper-Bound for the Collision Probability of Two Polyno-
mials of Pn(x)
In this subsection, the upper-bound for the collision probability of any two polynomials of
Pn(x) is given.
Lemma 1. ∀f(x) 6= g(x) ∈ Pn(x), a ∈ G(f),b ∈ G(g), let z = a+b = (a0+b0, a1+b1, · · · ).
We have
coll(a,b) = {a[k, n] : 0 ≤ k < N, z[k, n] = [0]n}
where [0]n denotes a n-length zero-sequence.
Proof. For 0 ≤ k < N , we have a[k, n] = b[k, n] ⇐⇒ z[k, n] = [0]n.
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Lemma 2. ∀f(x) 6= g(x) ∈ Pn(x), let h(x) = f(x)g(x). We have
G(h) = G(f)⊕G(g) = {a + b : a ∈ G(f),b ∈ G(g)}.
Moreover, G(f)∗⊕G(g)∗ can be partitioned into N shift-equivalent classes G0, G1, . . . , G2n−2,
where
Gi = {Ljz : j ≥ 0},∀z ∈ Gi, 0 ≤ i < N
|G0| = |G1| = · · · = |G2n−2| = N
G0 ∪G1 ∪ · · · ∪G2n−2 = G(f)∗ ⊕G(g)∗
Gi ∩Gj = ∅, 0 ≤ i < j < N.
Proof. This lemma comes from [11, Chapter 4].
Theorem 1. ∀f(x) 6= g(x) ∈ Pn(x), we have
Pcoll(f, g) ≤ 2n−1/N.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Based on Theorem 1, the upper-bound shows
2n−1/N = 2n−1/(2n − 1)
= 2n−1/(2× 2n−1 − 1)
= 0.5 as n→∞.
6.2.2 Upper-Bound for the Collision Probability of Reciprocal
Polynomial Pairs of Pn(x)
In this subsection, the upper-bound for the collision probability of reciprocal polynomial
pairs of Pn(x) is given.
Lemma 3. ∀f(x) ∈ Pn(x), a ∈ G(f)∗⊕G(f−1)∗, there exists a unique integer j, 0 ≤ j < N ,
satisfying
Lja = (Lja)−1.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Theorem 2. ∀f(x) ∈ Pn(x), we have
Pcoll(f, f
−1) ≤ (2n−2 − 1 + 2bn/2c−1 + 2dn/2e−1)/N.
Proof. See Appendix G.
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Figure 6.1: Collision Probabilities and Theoretical Upper-Bounds of Two Distinct Binary
Primitive Polynomials of the Same Degree.
6.3 Simulations and Conjectures of the New Frequency
Hopping System
Let
Pcoll[n] = {Pcoll(f, g) : f(x) 6= g(x) ∈ Pn(x)}
P
(r)
coll[n] = {Pcoll(f, f−1) : f(x) ∈ Pn(x)}.
For f1(x) 6= g1(x) ∈ Pn(x), Pcoll(f1, f−11 ) and Pcoll(g1, g−11 ) are regarded as two different
elements in P
(r)
coll[n]; meanwhile, for f2(x) 6= g2(x) ∈ Pn(x), Pcoll(f1, g1) and Pcoll(f2, g2) are
regarded as two different elements in Pcoll[n] if f1(x) 6= f2(x) or g1(x) 6= g2(x). Thus, we
have |Pcoll[n]| = |Pn(x)| · (|Pn(x)| − 1) and |P (r)coll[n]| = |Pn(x)|.
Based on exhaustive simulation in Figure 6.1, we have Pcoll[n] for 3 ≤ n ≤ 18 and P (r)coll[n]
for 3 ≤ n ≤ 22. In Figure 6.1, the curves labeled as “bound”, “maximum”, “average”,
and “minimum” display the theoretical upper-bound (see Theorem 1), maximum value,
average value, and minimum value of Pcoll[n], 3 ≤ n ≤ 18, respectively; meanwhile, the
curves labeled as “recBound” and “reciprocal” display the theoretical upper-bound (see
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Theorem 2) and the minimum value of P
(r)
coll[n], 3 ≤ n ≤ 22, respectively. Note that for
3 ≤ n ≤ 22, the simulation results show that
minP
(r)
coll[n] = maxP
(r)
coll[n].
In fact, we would like to give the following much stronger conjecture, which at least holds
for 3 ≤ n ≤ 22 according to the simulation results:
Conjecture 1. ∀f(x) 6= g(x) ∈ Pn(x) and ∀k ≥ 0, we have
|{(a,b) : a ∈ G(f)∗,b ∈ G(f−1)∗, |coll(a,b)| = k}|
=|{(a,b) : a ∈ G(g)∗,b ∈ G(g−1)∗, |coll(a,b)| = k}|.
Conjecture 1 indicates that the collision distribution in terms of the number of collisions
versus the number of shifts of any two distinct reciprocal m-sequences of the same degree
is the same.
Additionally, there are two assumptions based on the observation of the simulation
results. One is that most elements of Pcoll[n]\P (r)coll[n] may get close to 0.3935 as n increases
for n ≥ 10 in general. From the simulation, the average value of Pcoll[n] gets close to 0.3935
as the degree n increases from 10 to 18 and the variance in each degree becomes smaller
and smaller as n increases. For example, the average value and the variance of Pcoll[17] are
0.3935 and 8.3× 10−6, respectively, and the average value and the variance of Pcoll[18] are
0.3935 and 7.9× 10−6, respectively.
The other assumption is
minPcoll[n] = minP
(r)
coll[n],∀n ≥ 3, but not in \ {10, 12}
based on the simulation which gives the above equation for n ∈ {3, 4, · · · , 18} \ {10, 12}.
Note that the theoretical upper-bounds given by Theorems 1 and 2 converge to 0.5 and
0.25 respectively as n increases to +∞. Then, based on the two assumptions, we have the
second conjecture shown below:
Conjecture 2.
lim
k→+∞
|{i : 3 ≤ i ≤ k,minPcoll[i] = minP (r)coll[i]}|
k
= 1.
Conjecture 2 indicates that the collision probability of the reciprocal m-sequence pairs
gives the minimum collision probability in most of primitive polynomial degrees.
Note. The detail of the new FH system in this chapter can be found in our draft [12].
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter demonstrates the contributions of this thesis and the future work.
7.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, our main contributions are in Chapter 4, 5 and 6. These are summarized
below:
• Implementations of the OFDM Enc by SDR: In Chapter 4, we have imple-
mented the OFDM system with OFDM Enc scheme under the IEEE802.11a standard
in both microwave anechoic chamber and lab environment by SDR. Firstly, the spec-
trums at both sender side and receiver side are captured, and the best SDR has been
counted for the OFDM encryption scheme. Secondly, we also used GNU radio to
simulate the multipath AWGN channel in order to precisely check the influence of
the OFDM Enc on the OFDM system. Lastly, the data of BER versus multipath
ratio are also given by GNU radio, which is critical to show the multipath effect on
OFDM Enc.
• Found a multipath boundary in the OFDM Enc scheme: Based on the im-
plementation results in Chapter 5, if the two key streams are different in OFDM Enc,
the OFDM decryption scheme cannot decrypt the received data under the multipath
AWGN channel in practice. In detail, the implementation in GNU radio provides
the multipath boundary which significantly decreases the performance of the OFDM
Enc. For example, if the multipath ratio is fixed, the OFDM system with OFDM
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Enc cannot achieve lower BER than that on the boundary even though the system
has infinite SNR. The results also indicate that the OFDM system with OFDM Enc
has much higher BER than that of the OFDM system without OFDM Enc if the
multipath ratio is much lower than the boundary. Results of using two different m-
sequences in OFDM Enc give significant high BER in either lab or chamber. Since
the chamber is an isolated environment without any channel effects, it is conjectured
that there exist some unknown factors causing the high BER in the chamber, such
as pilot symbols, noises in USRP deceives and synchronization issues between the
transmitter and the receiver.
• Randomly selective m-sequence based BLADES system: In chapter 6, we
have proposed a new competitive FH system to overcome jamming attacks. The
collision analysis and its exhaustive emulation on two distinct m-sequences of the
same degree have been given. Based on the exhaustive emulation, we have proposed
two conjectures. One indicates that all reciprocal m-sequence pairs of the same
degree n have the same collision distribution. The other one indicates that the
collision probability of the reciprocal m-sequence pairs gives the minimum collision
probability in most of primitive polynomial degrees. Additionally, the theoretical
upper-bounds on the collision probability of two m-sequences of the same degree and
the collision probability of two reciprocal m-sequences of the same degree are given
to limit our conjectures.
7.2 Future Work
From the OFDM Enc encryption scheme given by [17], we found a multipath boundary
in the scheme which significantly reduced the performance of the OFDM system. This
finding is just one of significant channel effects on the system. Therefore, we will test other
channel effects such as the doppler effect and the frequency selective fading effect on the
OFDM system with the OFDM Enc encryption scheme. Also, the factors such as pilot
symbols, synchronization issues and noises from USRPs will be investigated in order to
reduce BER in OFDM Enc.
After obtaining those performance parameters of the OFDM Enc scheme, we will then
work on removing those effects and improving the performance of the OFDM system with
the OFDM Enc encryption scheme. The purpose would be to reduce the influence of the
OFDM Enc encryption scheme on the performance of the OFDM system. Following suc-
cessful improvement of the performance of the OFDM system with the OFDM encryption
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scheme, we plan to implement the OFDM Enc encryption scheme in LTE which has much
more complex structure than that of the OFDM system under IEEE802.11a standard.
As to the randomly selective m-sequence based BLADES system, we will exam the
jammer’s expected discovery time in future. In detail, if the jammer can control the
monitoring frequencies in order to achieve the lowest expected discovery time, it is necessary
to investigate the jamming resistance of the randomly selective m-sequence based BLADES
system.
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Appendix A
DATA: Multipath Channel Boundary
Multipath Boundary
Fir Filter Taps’ Coeffecients Ratio Without Enc With Enc
[0.799,0.201] 3.98 0 5.000E-01
[0.805,0.195] 4.13 0 3.131E-01
[0.814,0.186] 4.38 0 2.579E-01
[0.823,0.177] 4.65 0 2.166E-01
[0.832,0.168] 4.95 0 1.282E-01
[0.842,0.158] 5.33 0 6.278E-02
[0.851,0.149] 5.71 0 1.007E-02
[0.856,0.144] 5.94 0 1.225E-04
[0.861,0.139] 6.19 0 2.350E-06
[0.882,0.118] 7.47 0 8.660E-07
[0.892,0.108] 8.26 0 -
[0.914,0.086] 10.63 0 -
[0.937,0.063] 14.87 0 -
Table A.1: Multipath Boundary
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Appendix B
DATA: AWGN Multipath Channel
with SNR
AWGN Multipath Channel with SNR ≈ 18.8dB
Fir Filter Taps’ Coeffecients Ratio Without Enc With Enc
[0.799,0.201] 3.98 1.259E-05 -
[0.805,0.195] 4.13 9.931E-06 -
[0.814,0.186] 4.38 7.762E-06 -
[0.823,0.177] 4.65 6.166E-06 -
[0.832,0.168] 4.95 5.012E-06 3.253E-01
[0.842,0.158] 5.33 3.162E-06 2.212E-01
[0.851,0.149] 5.71 2.729E-06 1.919E-01
[0.861,0.139] 6.19 1.995E-06 9.303E-02
[0.882,0.118] 7.47 1.629E-06 6.141E-03
[0.892,0.108] 8.26 1.380E-06 9.041E-04
[0.914,0.086] 10.63 - 1.130E-05
[0.937,0.063] 14.87 - 1.928E-06
Table B.1: AWGN Multipath Channel with SNR ≈ 18.8dB
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AWGN Multipath Channel with SNR ≈ 20.1dB
Fir Filter Taps’ Coeffecients Ratio Without Enc With Enc
[0.799,0.201] 3.98 1.28825E-06 -
[0.805,0.195] 4.13 1.25893E-06 -
[0.814,0.186] 4.38 1.23027E-06 -
[0.823,0.177] 4.65 1.20226E-06 2.999E-01
[0.832,0.168] 4.95 1.1695E-06 2.344E-01
[0.842,0.158] 5.33 1.02329E-06 1.315E-01
[0.851,0.149] 5.71 9.77237E-07 4.716E-02
[0.861,0.139] 6.19 8.12831E-07 1.178E-02
[0.882,0.118] 7.47 7.24436E-07 4.377E-05
[0.892,0.108] 8.26 6.60693E-07 3.184E-06
[0.914,0.086] 10.63 - 4.898E-07
[0.937,0.063] 14.87 - 2.754E-07
Table B.2: AWGN Multipath Channel with SNR ≈ 20.1dB
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Appendix C
Fragments of Sent and Received
Messages for the Implementation in
Chamber
64
Figure C.1: Sent and Received Messages for the Case with k1 = k2 = (1,−1, 1) in the
Chamber
Figure C.2: Sent and Received Messages for the Case with k1 = k2 = (1,−1,−1, 1) in the
Chamber
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Figure C.3: Sent and Received Messages for the Case with k1 = k2 = (1,−1,−1, 1, 1) in
the Chamber
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Figure C.4: Sent and Received Messages for the Case with k1 = k2 = (1,−1, 1, 1, 1,−1)
in the Chamber
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Figure C.5: Sent and Received Messages for the Case with k1 = k2 = (1,−1, 1, 1, 1,−1,−1)
in the Chamber
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Appendix D
Fragments of Sent and Received
Messages for the Implementation in
Laboratory
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Figure D.1: Sent and Received Messages for the Case with k1 = k2 = (1,−1, 1) in the
Laboratory
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Figure D.2: Sent and Received Messages for the Case with k1 = k2 = (1,−1,−1, 1) in the
Laboratory
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Figure D.3: Sent and Received Messages for the Case with k1 = k2 = (1,−1,−1, 1, 1) in
the Laboratory
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Figure D.4: Sent and Received Messages for the Case with k1 = k2 = (1,−1, 1, 1, 1,−1)
in the Laboratory
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Appendix E
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Use the same notations as in Lemma 2, denote
Ω = {a : a = (1, [0]l, 1, · · · ) ∈ G(h), n ≤ l < 2n}.
Since Ω ⊂ G(h)∗ and Ω ∩ (G(f) ∪G(g)) = ∅, we have
Ω ⊂ (G(f)∗ ⊕G(g)∗). (E.1)
Moreover, for 0 ≤ i < N , we have
Gi ∩ Ω 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ [0]n ∈ Gi[n] ⇐⇒ ∀a ∈ Gi, [0]n ∈ a[n].
Denote
I = {i : 0 ≤ i < N,Gi ∩ Ω 6= ∅}.
Based on Lemma 2 and Equation (E.1), we have
|I| ≤ |Ω|, (E.2)
where the inequality holds iff ∃i ∈ I satisfying |Gi ∩ Ω| > 1.
M -sequence of degree n has n degrees of the freedom. The multiplication of any two m-
sequences of the same degree n has 2n degrees of freedom. The fixed bits at the beginning
of those elements in Ω are n+i, i = 2, 3, 4, . . . , n+1 respectively. The corresponding degree
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of freedom of those elements are 2n− (n+ i), i = 2, 3, 4, . . . , n and 1 respectively. In brief,
we have
|Ω| = 1 +
n∑
i=2
22n−(n+i)
= 1 + 2n
n∑
i=2
2−i
= 1 + 2n(1/2− 2−n)
= 1 + 2n−1 − 1
= 2n−1 (E.3)
Consequently, from Equation (E.2) and Equation (E.3), we have
|I| ≤ |Ω| = 2n−1 (E.4)
Finally, from Lemma 2 and Equation (E.4), we could have
|coll(f, g)| = |{z : z ∈ G(f)∗ ⊕G(g)∗, [0]n ∈ z[n]}|
= |{Gi : 0 ≤ i < N, [0]n ∈ Gi[n]}| ·N
= |I| ·N
≤ 2n−1N,
Thus, we have
Pcoll(f, g) = |coll(f, g)|/N2 ≤ 2n−1/N.
This completes the proof.
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Appendix F
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. For l > 0, denote
Λ(l) = {a : a ∈ {0, 1}l, a = a−1},
where a−1 is given by reversing all the elements of a. Λ(l) indeed consists of all the length-l
binary symmetrical sequences. In addition, denote
Λ = ∪l>0Λ(l).
With the same notations as in Theorem 1 (replace g by f−1), ∀a ∈ G(h)∗, if Λ∩a[2n] 6=
∅, there exists an integer j satisfying 0 ≤ j < N and (Lja)[N −n, 2n] ∈ Λ. In this case, we
have (Lja)[N−n, 2n] = (Lja)−1[N−n, 2n]. In addition, since h(x) = f(x)f−1(x) = h−1(x),
we have (Lja), (Lja)−1 ∈ G(h)∗. As the result, (Lja)[n,N−n−1] = (Lja)−1[n,N−n−1],
because there is no more degree of freedom after fixed 2n bits at (Lja)[N − n, 2n] =
(Lja)−1[N − n, 2n]. Therefore, we have
Lja = (Lja)−1. (F.1)
If j is not unique, there exists k 6= N−n satisfying 0 ≤ k < N and (Lja)[k, 2n] ∈ Λ. Then,
we have (Lja)[k, 2n] = (Lja)[2N −k− 2n, 2n] based on (F.1). In this case, a contradiction
happens because k 6≡ 2N − k − 2n mod N . Thus, j is unique if given a, implying that
|Λ ∩ a[2n]| ≤ 1,∀a ∈ G(h)∗. (F.2)
In the following, we complete the proof by proving that
|Λ ∩ a[2n]| = 1,∀a ∈ G(f)∗ ⊕G(f−1)∗. (F.3)
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Since f(x) 6= f−1(x), we have
a  a−1,∀a ∈ G(f)∗ ∪G(f−1)∗. (F.4)
Then, based on (F.1) and (F.4), we have Λ ∩ (G(f)∗ ∪ G(f−1)∗)[2n] = ∅. Note that
Λ(2n) ⊂ G(h)[2n]. Therefore, we have
|Λ ∩ (G(f)∗ ⊕G(f−1)∗)[2n]| = |Λ(2n)| − 1 = N. (F.5)
Based on (F.2) and (F.5), we have
|Λ ∩Gi[2n]| = 1, 0 ≤ i < N.
Thus, (F.3) holds. This completes the proof.
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Appendix G
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. With the same notations as in Theorem 1, we have
Ω = {a : a = (1, [0]l, 1, · · · ) ∈ G(h), n ≤ l < 2n},
where
G(h) = G(f)⊕G(f−1) = {a + b : a ∈ G(f),b ∈ G(f−1)}
f(x) 6= f−1(x) ∈ Pn(x), and h(x) = f(x)f−1(x)
Ω ⊂ (G(f)∗ ⊕G(j−1)∗),
and
I = {i : 0 ≤ i < N,Gi ∩ Ω 6= ∅}.
∀a ∈ Ω, let l(a) be the number of the consecutive zeros starting from a1, i.e., a[0, 2 +
l(a)] = (1, [0]l(a), 1). In addition, based on Lemma 3, there exists an unique integer j(a)
satisfying 0 ≤ j(a) < N and Lj(a)a = (Lj(a)a)−1. In this case, we have (Lj(a)a)[N −
j(a), 2 + l(a)] = (Lj(a)a)[j(a)− l(a) +N − 2, 2 + l(a)] = (1, [0]l(a), 1). Thus, we have
L2j(a)−l(a)+N−2a ∈ Ω.
Let
A = {a : a ∈ Ω, a = L2j(a)−l(a)+N−2a}.
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∀i ∈ I, if Gi ∩ (Ω \ A) 6= ∅, then ∀a ∈ Gi ∩ (Ω \ A). Let b = L2j(a)−l(a)+N−2a, then
we have l(b) = l(a) and j(b) ≡ j(a) − (2j(a) − l(a) + N − 2) mod N . Thus, we have
L2j(b)−l(b)+N−2b = a 6= b, implying b ∈ Gi ∩ (Ω \A) and |Gi ∩ (Ω \A)| ≥ 2. Furthermore,
we have
|I| ≤ |Ω \ A|
2
+ |A| = 2n−2 + |A|
2
. (G.1)
Now, we focus on |A|. Let
B = {a : a ∈ G(h)∗, a = a−1, a[N − dn/2e, 2dn/2e] = [0]2dn/2e},
C = {a : a ∈ G(h)∗, a = a−1, a[2n−1 − 1− bn/2c, 2bn/2c+ 1] = [0]2bn/2c+1}.
Then, we have
∀a ∈ A⇒ a = L2j(a)−l(a)+N−2a
⇒ 2j(a)− l(a) +N − 2 ≡ 0 mod N
⇒ j(a) ≡
{
(l(a) + 2)/2 mod N l(a) is even,
(l(a) +N + 2)/2 mod N l(a) is odd.
⇒
{
[0]l(a) = (Lj(a)a)[N − l(a)
2
, l(a)] l(a) is even,
[0]l(a) = (Lj(a)a)[2n−1 − 1+l(a)
2
, l(a)] l(a) is odd.
⇒
{
Lj(a)a ∈ B l(a) is even,
Lj(a)a ∈ C l(a) is odd. (G.2)
∀a 6= b ∈ A with l(a) ≡ l(b) mod 2, we have
mod(j(a)− j(b), N) = mod( l(a)− l(b)
2
, N) ∈ [0, n) ∪ (N − n,N). (G.3)
From Equation (G.3), if
mod(j(a)− j(b), N) = 0,
we have
L mod (j(a)−j(b),N)a = a 6= b.
79
Additionally, if
mod(j(a)− j(b), N) ∈ (0, n),
the L mod (j(a)−j(b),N)a[0, 1] bit is always equal to 0, but the b[0, 1] bit is defined as 1, so
L mod (j(a)−j(b),N)a and b are not equal. Besides, if
mod(j(a)− j(b), N) ∈ (N − n,N),
the L mod (j(a)−j(b),N)a[l(b) + 1, 1] bit is always 0, but the b[l(b) + 1, 1] bit is defined as 1,
so they are not equal. Finally, we have
L mod (j(a)−j(b),N)a 6= b⇒ Lj(a)a 6= Lj(b)b. (G.4)
Denote Ae = {a : a ∈ A, l(a) is even} and Ao = {a : a ∈ A, l(a) is odd}. Based on
(G.2) and (G.4), we have |Ae| ≤ |B| = 2bn/2c − 1 and |Ao| ≤ |C| = 2dn/2e − 1. Then, we
have
|A| = |Ae|+ |Ao| ≤ |B|+ |C| = 2bn/2c + 2dn/2e − 2. (G.5)
Consequently, based on (G.1) and (G.5), we have
Pcoll(f, f
−1) = |I|/N ≤ (2n−2 − 1 + 2bn/2c−1 + 2dn/2e−1)/N.
This completes the proof.
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